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new political outcome will be found in
a stand-alone approach that emphasizes military solutions to end conflict.
Moreover, it is perhaps discomforting to
read that the political-settlement process
in states that experience civil wars does
not lend itself to an easily replicated
road map. Rather, this book provides
nuanced and thoughtful analytical
windows into the similarities and
differences among these civil wars and
some blunt assessments from experts
concerning the limitations and possibilities of war-termination processes.
KURT BUCKENDORF

The Kaiser’s U-boat Assault on America: Germany’s Great War Gamble in the First World War,
by Hans Joachim Koerver. Philadelphia: Pen and
Sword, 2020. 360 pages. $34.95.

George M. Cohan’s 1917 patriotic
anthem “Over There” was written to
encourage young American men to
enlist in the military and fight with
determination in Europe, such that “we
won’t come back till it’s over, over there.”
What most Americans did not expect
was that German forces, specifically
those of the Kriegsmarine, might seek
to fight in American waters—“over
here.” Military historian Hans Joachim
Koerver’s engaging history of that
effort affords readers a detailed study
of an oft-overlooked aspect of the First
World War. The devastating effects
of German U-boat technology and
warfare in the Second World War
had their genesis in the experience of
and lessons derived from undersea
operations of the First World War.
Providing a study of diplomatic and
economic aspects of the U-boat
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operations against the United States
as well as the tactical and strategic use
of the U-boats, Koerver provides a
volume that is extensively researched
in primary and secondary sources,
yet very readable. Numerous charts,
graphs, and photographs enhance the
volume. Additionally, four appendices,
including one providing copies of
pertinent documents, supply resources
for those wishing to do further study.
Of particular note to those with an interest in the U.S. Navy in Newport, Rhode
Island, and the Naval War College is
Koerver’s presentation of the U-53 incident of 7 October 1916. The day after
U-53 left Newport, it boarded one U.S.
merchant vessel, reviewed the cargo list,
and let the ship pass; however, it then
sank five non-U.S. ships in the vicinity of
the U.S. lightship Nantucket (LV 112)—
two of them in the presence of seventeen
neutral U.S. destroyers from Newport.
In a volume containing much information and many details, readers will
appreciate the presentation of the material in fifty-eight short chapters grouped
into five sections, one for the prewar
setting and one for each year of the war,
excluding 1918. The author addresses
many aspects of the U-boat assault and
views the ethical and legal dimensions of
Germany’s unrestricted warfare in 1917,
as well as a host of other matters, such as
U-boat construction, manning, armament, tactics and operations, strategic
significance, and propaganda. Yet the
work is balanced and affords readers—
whether they begin with little knowledge
of U-boat operations or greater knowledge and interest—a very useful volume.
Ships receiving individual chapters
pertaining to their destruction are RMS
Lusitania (7 May 1915), SS Arabic (19
August 1915), and SS Sussex (24 March
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1916), aboard each of which U.S. citizens
died. Each ship was attacked prior to
America’s entry into the war, and each
attack initiated diplomatic fervor and
furor from President Woodrow Wilson
and the United States. Each attack was
avoidable, did little to further Germany’s
war aims, and significantly damaged the
country’s international reputation and
image. Yet it was not these three ships
that Wilson referenced in his 2 April
1917 war message to Congress; rather, it
was the sinking of three U.S. merchant
ships—SS Vigilancia (16 March 1917),
SS City of Memphis (17 March 1917),
and the tanker SS Illinois (18 March
1917)—that became the tipping point
for America’s entry into the war.
As mentioned, the text is interspersed
with numerous photographs and charts
that supplement the content. Readers
will find the book to be an enjoyable
and engaging work. The several appendices, whose contents include photographs of decoded German documents
from Room 40 within the directorate
of intelligence of the British Admiralty, enhance the work by providing a
glimpse of the tedious yet significant
work of intercepting and decrypting
German naval and diplomatic traffic,
including the Zimmermann telegram, to
which the author devotes several pages.
The book’s title is somewhat misleading,
in that out of five sections only one is
devoted to the U-boat assault on the
United States. A more detailed index
would benefit readers. Some readers will
wish for more details on specific boats
or incidents, but Koerver states that he
is writing for a general audience (p. vii).
Thus the work should be read by those
who seek to gain a broader understanding of the First World War at sea and the
importance of U-boats in that conflict.
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The American Way of Empire: How America Won
a World—but Lost Her Way, by James Kurth.
Washington, DC: Washington Books, 2019. 464
pages. $30.

In the second year of the Peloponnesian
War, the Athenian people reproached
Pericles for bringing invasion, plague,
and ruin upon them. Pericles warned
his fellow citizens that Athens possessed an empire and that, while it
might have been wrong to take it, it
would be unsafe to let it go. Persuaded,
the Athenians persisted with policies
that made them even more enemies,
including among erstwhile allies,
ultimately leading to the dissolution
of their empire. In The American Way
of Empire, James Kurth draws on but
departs from Pericles as he offers his
own warning: that America no longer
possesses an empire, and—to those still
seeking to preserve this fallen empire—it
would be unsafe not to let it go.
Kurth, a professor emeritus of political
science at Swarthmore College, is a
luminary of U.S. foreign policy. A PhD
from Harvard who studied under Samuel
P. Huntington, to whom he dedicates the
book, Kurth is a member of the Council
on Foreign Relations and a senior fellow
at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.
Kurth has authored over 120 articles, and
he revised some of them to serve as chapters in the book’s five substantive parts,
which are titled “Hegemony,” “Ideology,”
“Strategy,” “Insurgency,” and “Political
Economy.” This composition allows the
reader to absorb the book in chapters
or parts or as a whole. That the chapters
derive from articles originally published
as early as the 1990s yet address current crises so deftly reflects Kurth’s
prescience and the book’s timeliness.
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